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ABSTRACT
We consider the noisy thermal amplifier channel, where signal modes are amplified together with environmental
thermal modes. We focus on the secret-key capacity of this channel, which is the maximum amount of secret
bits that two remote parties can generate by means of the most general adaptive protocol, assisted by unlimited
and two-way classical communication. For this channel only upper and lower bounds are known, and in this
work we improve the lower bound. We consider a protocol based on squeezed states and homodyne detections,
in both direct and reverse reconciliation. In particular, we assume that trusted thermal noise is mixed on beam
splitters controlled by the parties in a way to assist their homodyne detections. The new improved lower bounds
to the secret-key capacity are obtained by optimizing the key rates over the variance of the trusted noise injected,
and the transmissivity of the parties’ beam splitters. Our results confirm that there is a separation between the
coherent information of the thermal amplifier channel and its secret key capacity.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past decades, quantum information science1, 2 has successfully achieved a huge amount of goals. In
particular quantum key distribution (QKD) has emerged as the most mature quantum technology. The aim
of QKD is to distribute secret keys between two parties, a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob), who perform
a communication scheme in two stages. The first stage is quantum communication over a quantum channel
controlled by an eavesdropper (Eve), ending with Alice and Bob sharing a raw key. During the second stage of
classical communication, the parties run a classical protocol of error correction, sifting and privacy amplification.
In this way they extract a shorter key over which Eve only has a negligible amount of knowledge. The fundamental
mechanism ensuring security is the no-cloning theorem,3 which forbids a perfect copy of the non-orthogonal signal
states sent by Alice.
Two main designs of QKD exist. One is based on qubits,4 the other is based on continuous-variable (CV)
quantum systems,5, 6 which are described by an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space. In particular, Gaussian CV
QKD6 received a lot of attention for the relative simplicity of its theoretical analysis, and the simplicity of
its experimental realization based on cheap, off-the-shelf, linear optical elements and highly efficient homodyne
detectors, even at non-standard frequencies.7 During the past years, the research in Gaussian QKD has led to
the design and experimental implementation of a number of protocols, including one-way,8–22 and two-way23–30
schemes, as well as the study of measurement-device-independent31–37 schemes.
An important goal in this research area is to determine the optimal secret key rate, or secret-key capacity, over
the various models of quantum communication channels. This computation is generally complicated due to the
fact that feedback has to be taken into account. More precisely, one has to optimize the key-rate over adaptive
LOCCs, i.e., local operations (LOs) assisted by unlimited two-way classical communication (CC). The combined
use of the relative entropy of entanglement (REE) and teleportation stretching allowed PLOB38 to upperbound
the secret-key capacities of Pauli channels, erasure channels, amplitude damping channels, and bosonic Gaussian
channels (see also the follow-up works39–43). Among the Gaussian channels, the thermal loss channel and the
thermal amplifier are the most interesting and important. In a previous work,44 we showed how the lower bound
to the secret key capacity of the thermal loss channel can be improved by exploiting the benefits of injecting
trusted thermal noise.12, 18 This type of analysis has not been yet performed for the thermal amplifier channel.
In this work, we improve the lower bound to the secret-key capacity of the thermal amplifier channel by
computing the achievable rate of a QKD protocol based on squeezed states and homodyne detections. We
assume that the parties possess quantum memory so that they do not need to reconcilate their bases, i.e., the
choices of the q or the p quadrature. We also assume that trusted thermal noise is locally used by Alice or Bob,
depending on whether the protocol is implemented in direct reconcilation (DR) or reverse reconciliation (RR).
Under these conditions, the lower bound based on the coherent information45, 46 is always beaten by the rate in
DR (and also outperformed by the RR rate in a small region for low gains and high thermal noise).
2. UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS TO THE SECRET-KEY CAPACITY OF THE
THERMAL AMPLIFIER
Consider two parties, Alice and Bob, performing an adaptive protocol over a quantum channel E . After n uses,
they share the output state ρn := ρ (E⊗n) which depends on the sequence of adaptive LOCCs performed, i.e.,
L = {Λ0,Λ1, ...,Λn}. Let φn be a private target state47 with information content equal to nRn secret bits. The
output state ρn and φn fulfill the ǫ-security relation ||ρn − φn|| ≤ ǫ. Now, the generic two-way capacity of the
channel can be obtained by optimizing over all the possible LOCC-sequences L, and by taking the limit of infinite
channel uses, i.e., n→∞. In formulas we can define the secret key capacity as follows
K(E) := sup
L
lim
n→∞
Rn. (1)
This quantity gives the maximum achievable number of secret bits that can be transmitted per channel use.
Let us introduce the quadrature vector xˆ := (q, p)T . Then, a thermal amplifier channel Eg,n¯ corresponds to
the transformation
xˆ→ √gxˆ+
√
g − 1xˆE (2)
where g > 1 is the gain, and xˆE are the quadratures of a thermal environment mode E with n¯ mean number of
photons. Let us set ω = 2n¯+ 1 and
h(x) :=
x+ 1
2
log2
x+ 1
2
− x− 1
2
log2
x− 1
2
. (3)
Then, we may write the secret-key capacity of the thermal amplifier channel K(Eg,n¯) as
Ω(g, n¯) ≤ K(Eg,n¯) ≤ Φ(g, n¯), (4)
where the lower bound48 is given by
Ω(g, n¯) = log2
(
g
g − 1
)
− h(ω) (5)
and corresponds to the coherent information of the channel, which is defined as the coherent information of its
(asymptotic) Choi matrix.38, 49 In Eq. (4), the upper bound is computed from the REE50–52 of the (asymptotic)
Choi matrix and is equal to38
Φ(g, n¯) =


log2
(
gn¯+1
g−1
)
− h(ω), for n¯ < (g − 1)−1
0, otherwise.
(6)
3. IMPROVING THE LOWER BOUND
We now present a QKD protocol whose key rate in DR and RR improves the lower bound in Eq. (4). Even though
the improvement found is small, it is meaningful because it shows that the coherent information of the thermal
amplifier channel is cannot be its secret key capacity. First we derive the new achievable rates in subsections 3.1
and 3.2. Then we numercally compare the results in subsection 3.3.
3.1 Achievable rate in direct reconciliation
We show the following result.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a thermal amplifier channel, with gain g and thermal noise ω. Its secret key rate is
lower-bounded by the achievable DR rate
R◮(g, ω) = max
ηA,γ
R◮ (g, ω, ηA, γ) , (7)
where
R◮(g, ω, ηA, γ) :=
1
2
log2
g[gηAω + γ(g − 1)(1− ηA)]
(g − 1)[gγ(1− ηA) + ηAω(g − 1)] + h
(√
ω[gηA + γω(g − 1)(1− ηA)]
gηAω + γ(g − 1)(1− ηA)
)
− h(ω), (8)
and the maximization is over transmissivity ηA of a beam splitter at Alice’s side, and the thermal variance γ ≥ 1.
Proof. Consider the Gaussian CV-QKD protocol described in Fig. 1. We study its security in the entanglement-
based (EB) representation. Thus, we assume that Alice has a two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state Φµ of
modes A0 and B0. The covariance matrix (CM) describing this zero mean Gaussian state is the following
6
VA0B0 = VTMSV(µ) :=
(
µI
√
µ2 − 1Z√
µ2 − 1Z µI
)
, (9)
where I =diag(1, 1) and Z =diag(1,−1), and µ is the variance of the TMSV state. Alice’s local mode A0 is
processed by a beam splitter with transmissivity ηA, together with mode v in a thermal state of variance γ,
and CM Vv = γI. One of the outputs, A
′, is discarded, while the other, A, is homodyned randomly switching
between quadrature q and p. This operation prepares thermal states in the travelling mode B0.
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Figure 1. Protocol with trusted thermal noise in DR. Alice has a TMSV state, whose mode B0 is sent to Bob through
a thermal amplifier channel with gain g. Mode A0 is processed by a beam splitter (BS) with transmissivity ηA together
with a thermal mode v with variance γ, and then measured by a homodyne detector in q or p. The attack is performed
by Eve, who exploits modes e and E in a TMSV state (with variance ω) and stores the output in Eve’s quantum memory
(EQM). The signals from Alice are stored by Bob in his quantum memory (BQM) and homodyned after Alice has sent
to Bob the correct sequence of homodyne detections to perform.
Mode B0 is sent through the thermal amplifier channel with gain g > 1 and thermal noise ω = 2n¯+ 1. The
thermal input mode E is part of Eve’s TMSV state with CM VeE = VTMSV(ω) as in Fig. 1. Eve’s output
modes e and E′ are stored in a quantum memory, which is coherently measured at the end of the protocol
(collective attack). The channel output B, travelling to Bob, is stored in Bob’s quantum memory (BQM) for
later measurements. After many uses of the channel (n ≫ 1), Alice communicates which quadrature she has
measured in each round, thus Bob can perform exactly the same sequence of homodyne detections on the stored
modes, and then infer the outcomes of Alice’s preparation stage.
The initial global state ρ0 of Alice, Bob and Eve is given by the tensor product ρ0 = ρA0B0 ⊗ ρeE ⊗ ρv,
having CM V◮0 = VA0B0⊕VeE⊕Vv = V◮A0B0eEv. For convenience, we rearrange the state as V◮0 = VA0vB0Ee,
and process it by a sequence of symplectic transformation describing the evolution throughout the beam splitter
(ηA) and the amplifier (g). We first process mode A0 and v, by applying the symplectic transformation V˜
◮ =
SηAV0S
T
ηA
, where SηA := TBS(ηA)⊕ I⊕ I⊕ I, with
TBS(ηA) :=
( √
ηAI
√
1− ηAI
−√1− ηAI √ηAI
)
. (10)
Then, we process the CM V˜◮ to consider the evolution of the state through the thermal amplifier, by applying
the symplectic transformation SgV˜
◮STg , where Sg := I⊕ I⊕TAMP (g)⊕ I, and
TAMP (g) :=
( √
gI
√
g − 1Z√
g − 1Z √gI
)
. (11)
Thus, we can compute the CM V◮, corresponding to the quantum state ρAA′BE′e. Then we can trace out mode
A′ to obtain the output state ρABE′e = TrA′(ρAA′BE′e) with CM V
◮
ABE′e. From this CM we may compute
Alice’s and Bob’s mutual information IAB as well as Eve’s Holevo function χAE , bounding Eve’s knowledge on
Alice’s encoding variables.
Under ideal conditions of perfect reconciliation efficiency, the key rate in DR is given by R◮ := IAB − χAE .
We can derive the analytical expression of the asymptotic key rate, when the Gaussian modulation is large
µ→∞. To compute IAB , let us first consider the CM describing modes A and B. This is given by the following
expression
V◮AB =
(
[ηAµ+ (1 − ηA)γ]I
√
gηA(µ2 − 1)Z√
gηA(µ2 − 1)Z [gµ+ (g − 1)ω]I
)
, (12)
from which we can extract Alice’s variance VA = ηAµ + (1 − ηA)γ. Applying homodyne detection on mode B
we obtain the following expression for Alice’s variance conditioned to Bob outcomes
VA|β =
gγ (1− ηA) + ηAω (g − 1)
g
. (13)
From the expression of VA and VA|β , and using the definition of mutual information IAB =
1
2
log2 VAV
−1
A|β, we
obtain the asymptotic Alice and Bob’s mutual information, which is given by
IAB
µ→∞
=
1
2
log2
gηAµ
gγ(1− ηA) + ηAω(g − 1) . (14)
We then compute Eve’s Holevo function, defined as χAE := ST −S◮C , where ST is the von Neumann entropy
of ρE′e, and SC is that of the conditional state ρE′e|A. We consider the block of CM V given by
V◮E′eA =
(
V◮E′e C
C VA
)
, (15)
where VA = [ηAµ+ (1− ηA)γ]I, and
V◮E′e =
(
[(g − 1)µ+ gω]I
√
g(ω2 − 1)Z√
g(ω2 − 1)Z ωI
)
, C =
(√
(g − 1)ηA(µ2 − 1)I
0I
)
. (16)
We then compute the asymptotic symplectic spectrum of V◮E′e, obtaining the following symplectic eigenvalues
{ν1, ν2} µ→∞→ {(g − 1)µ, ω}. (17)
The total von Neumann entropy is ST = h(ν1) + h(ν2). Considering that h(x) = log2(ex/2) for x→∞, we can
obtain the following asymptotic formula
ST
µ→∞
= log2
e
2
(g − 1)µ+ h(ω). (18)
After Alice’s homodyne detection of quadrature q (or p) on mode A, we also obtain Eve’s conditional CM
V◮
E′e|A = V
◮
E′e −C (ΠVAΠ)−1CT , (19)
where Π = diag(1, 0) for homodyne detection on q and Π = diag(0, 1) for homodyne detection on p. From
Eq. (19) we can compute the symplectic spectrum of V◮
E′e|A. After some algebra and working in the limit of
large modulation (µ→∞), we obtain the analytical expressions of the symplectic eigenvalues
ν¯◮1
µ→∞
=
√
(g − 1)[gηAω + γ(g − 1)(1− ηA)]
ηA
µ, ν¯◮2
µ→∞
=
√
ω[gηA + γω(g − 1)(1− ηA)]
gηAω + γ(g − 1)(1− ηA) . (20)
From this symplectic spectrum we can compute the conditional von Neumann entropy SC = h(ν¯1) + h(ν¯2).
For large µ, it becomes
S◮C
µ→∞
=
1
2
log2
e2
4
(g − 1)[gηAω + γ(g − 1)(1 − ηA)]
ηA
µ+ h
(
ν¯◮2
)
. (21)
Combining Eqs. (18) and (21) in the definition of the Holevo function χAE := ST − S◮C , we derive
χAE
µ→∞
=
1
2
log2
(g − 1)ηAµ
gηAω + γ(g − 1)(1− ηA) + h(ω)− h(ν¯
◮
2 ). (22)
Finally, using Eqs. (14) and (22), we obtain the analytic expression of the asymptotic key rate in DR, which is
given in Eq. (8). 
The secret key rate of Eq. (8) can be optimized over Alice’s free parameters, which are the transmissivity
ηA ∈ [0, 1] and the variance γ ≥ 1. When ηA = 1, which means we have no trusted noise injected by Alice, it
is easy to verify that R◮(g, ω, 1, γ) = log2[g/(g − 1)] − h(ω), corresponding to the previous lower bound Ω in
Eq. (5). It is therefore clear that the optimized achievable rate R◮ in Eq. (7) is ≥ Ω for any value of the gain.
In the numerical comparison below (subsection 3.3) we explicitly show that there is a strict separation, so that
we have R◮ > Ω in a wide range.
3.2 Achievable rate in reverse reconciliation
We now show the following.
Theorem 3.2. Consider a thermal amplifier channel with gain g and thermal noise ω. Its secret key rate is
lower-bounded by the achievable RR rate
R◭(g, ω) = max
ηB ,γ
R◭ (g, ω, ηB, γ) , (23)
where
R◭(g, ω, ηB, γ) :=
1
2
log2
ηBω + γ(g − 1)(1− ηB)
(g − 1)[γ(1− ηB) + ηBω(g − 1)] + h
(√
ω[ηB − γω(g − 1)(1− ηB)]
ηBω + γ(g − 1)(1− ηB)
)
− h(ω), (24)
and the maximization is over the transmissivity ηB of Bob’s beam splitter, and the thermal variance γ ≥ 1.
Proof. The proof is similar to the DR discussed in previous section. Consider the Gaussian protocol in
Fig. 2. Alice starts from the same TMSV state Φµ, of modes A0 and B0, given in Eq. (9). Now, it is Alice’s
mode A that is stored in a Alice’s quantum memory (AQM) for later measurements, while mode B0 travels to
Bob through the amplifier channel. Bob implements a noisy detection, mixing the input mode with a thermal
mode v with variance γ via a beam splitter whose transmissivity is ηB . Then Bob measures the q or the p
quadrature (communicating its choices at the end of the quantum communication after n≫ 1 rounds).
The initial global state of Alice, Bob and Eve has CM V◭0 = VAB0⊕VeE⊕Vv = V◭A0B0eEv, and we again
rearrange the modes so that V◭0 = V
◭
A0vB0Ee
. This state is processed by the amplifier (g) and then the
TMSV
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HomodyneHomodyne


	
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Figure 2. Protocol with trusted thermal noise in RR. Alice starts from a TMSV where mode B0 is sent to Bob through
a thermal amplifier channel with gain g (and thermal noise ω), while mode A0 is stored in Alice’s quantum memory
(AQM), waiting for the correct sequence of homodyne detections, which is announced by Bob at the end of the protocol.
The attack is assumed to be collective, with Eve using a TMSV state, whose output modes, e and E′, are stored in her
quantum memory (EQM). At the channel output, the signals are processed within Bob’s private space, by a beam splitter
(BS) with transmissivity ηB and a thermal mode v with variance γ. The signal modes are then homodynes either in q
or p. At the end, Bob publicly declares to Alice his sequence of homodynes. At this point, Alice performs the correct
sequence of homodyne detections on the modes A she stored in her quantum memory.
beam splitter (ηB). First we obtain V˜
◭ = SgV
◭
0 S
T
g , where Sg has been defined above, and then we compute
V◭ = SηBV˜
◭STηB , where SηB := I⊕TBS(ηB) ⊕ I⊕ I, with TBS(·) and TAMP (·) given in Eq. (10) and (11).
Discarding Bob’s mode B′, we compute the output state ρ◭ABE′e = TrB′(ρAB′BE′e) with CM V
◭
ABE′e. From this
CM we may compute the secret key rate in RR, i.e.,
R◭ = IAB − χBE , (25)
where χBE is Eve’s Holevo information on Bob’s outcomes. The analytical form of R
◭ is obtained under the
assumption of large modulation µ→∞.
The CM describing Alice’s and Bob’s output modes A and B is the following
V◭AB =
(
µI
√
gηB(µ2 − 1)Z√
gηB(µ2 − 1)Z [ηB(gµ+ (g − 1)ω) + (1 − ηB)γ]I
)
. (26)
We can therefore compute Alice and Bob’s mutual information
I◭AB
µ→∞
=
1
2
log2
gηBµ
γ(1− ηB) + (g − 1)ηBω . (27)
Eve’s Holevo information can be written as χBE = S
◭
T − S◭C , where S◭T is the von Neumann entropy for Eve’s
total state ρE′e, while S
◭
C is obtained from the conditional quantum state ρE′e|B . For its computation, consider
the following CMs
V◭BE′e =
(
V◭E′e C¯
C¯ VB
)
, V◭E′e =
(
[(g − 1)µ+ gω]I
√
g(ω2 − 1)Z√
g(ω2 − 1)Z ωI
)
, C¯ =
(√
g(g − 1)ηB(µ+ ω)Z√
(g − 1)ηB(ω2 − 1)I
)
, (28)
where VB = [ηB(gµ+ (g − 1)ω) + (1 − ηB)γ]I. Clearly, we need to compute only Eve’s conditional symplectic
spectrum, obtained from Eve and Bob’s CM, V◭BE′e by applying homodyne detection on Bob mode B. This
provides the conditional CM
V◭
E′e|B = V
◭
E′e − C¯ (ΠVBΠ)−1 C¯T , (29)
whose symplectic eigenvalues have the following asymptotic expressions
ν¯◭1
µ→∞
=
√
(g − 1)[ηBω + γ(g − 1)(1− ηB)]
gηB
µ, ν¯◭2
µ→∞
=
√
ω[ηB + γω(g − 1)(1− ηB)]
ηBω + γ(g − 1)(1− ηB) . (30)
Therefore, the asymptotic Eve’s Holevo information is given by
χBE
µ→∞
=
1
2
log2
(g − 1)µ
ηBω + γ(g − 1)(1− ηB) + h(ω)− h(ν¯2). (31)
Combining Eqs. (27) and (31), in Eq. (25), we find the formula of the asymptotic key rate in RR in the asymptotic
limit of large Gaussian modulation, which coincides with that given in Eq. (24). The secret key rate of Eq. (24)
is then optimized over Bob’s free parameters ηB ∈ [0, 1] and γ ≥ 1. 
3.3 Comparison
The performances of the new lower bounds are summarized in Fig. 3. The left panel compares the improved
lower bound in the DR R◮ of Eq. (7) (red-dashed line) with respect to the previous lower bound Ω of Eq. (5)
given by the coherent information of the channel (black-solid line). We also show the upper bound Φ of Eq. (6)
denoted by the black-dashed line. Then, we compare the security thresholds in the right panel of Fig. 3. Let
us define the excess noise of the thermal amplifier channel as ǫ = (g − 1)(ω − 1)/g. Then, we may write the
rates as R = R(g, ǫ). Setting R = 0, we therefore find the maximally-tolerable excess noise as a function of
the gain, i.e., ǫ = ǫ(g). Starting from Ω and the two optimized rates R◮ and R◭, we therefore compute the
corresponding security thresholds ǫΩ(g), ǫ
◮(g) and ǫ◭(g) which are plotted in the right panel of Fig. 3. As we
can see, ǫ◮(g) > ǫΩ(g) for any g, while ǫ
◭(g) outperforms ǫΩ(g) only for smal gains.
Upper Bound
CI Lower Bound
Improved Lower Bound R
CI Upper Bound
CI Lower Bound
Improved Lower 
Bound RϵΩ
ϵ
Ω
(g)
ϵ (g)
ϵ (g)
Figure 3. Comparison between the previous lower bound and the new improved results. In the left panel, we consider a
thermal amplifier channel with n¯ = 1 photons and arbitrary gain g. We then compare the new lower bound R◮ of Eq. (7)
(red-dashed line) with the coherent information of the channel Ω of Eq (5) (solid-black line). We also show the upper
bound Φ of Eq. (6) (black-dashed line). In the right panel, we compare the security thresholds ǫΩ(g) (black-solid line),
ǫ◮(g) (red-solid line), and ǫ◭(g) (black-dashed line).
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have studied a QKD protocol whose rate is able to improve the lower bound to the secret-key
capacity of the thermal amplifier channel. In DR this improvement occurs for any value of the gain g and the
thermal noise n¯ of the channel. Our protocol is based on randomly-switched squeezed states and homodyne
detections, which are perfectly reconciliated by resorting to a quantum memory. Most importantly, we employ a
beam-splitter and trusted thermal noise just before the homodyne detector. The large-modulation (µ→∞) and
asymptotic (n → ∞) secret key rate is then optimized over the free parameters of the over-all noisy detection.
Even though the gap between the new lower bounds and the upper bound is still quite large, our work confirms
the fact that the coherent information of the thermal amplifer channel is well separated from its secret key
capacity. This also seems to suggest that the distribution of secret keys over this quantum channel might occur
at higher rates than the distribution of entanglement or the transmission of quantum information.
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